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Chapter 16
Why Do Hills Look So Steep?
Frank H. Durgin and Zhi Li
INTRODUCTION
A pervasive illusion in normal human experience is the 
misperception of surface orientation or slant. An outdoor 
path that ascends a hill of some 5° is typically judged to be 
about 20° whether viewed from the top or bottom (Proffitt, 
Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995). Conversely a hill that 
appears to be about 30° to the casual observer will typi­
cally turn out to be between 7° and 10° upon measurement. 
The magnitude of this error is illustrated in Figure II. 16-1. 
With experience, skiers, hikers, engineers, and other fre­
quent viewers of measured hills become aware of this per­
ceptual error and may learn to make more accurate verbal 
estimates. However, as far as is known, the underlying 
perceptual bias seems to persist (Durgin & Li, 2011a). In 
this chapter we consider several different forms of theory 
that have been proposed for understanding the overestima­
tion of geographical slant in the context of summarizing 
relevant findings.
To begin with ecological considerations, note that the 
powerful force of gravity, including both its role in sur­
face erosion and its role in toppling leaning structures, 
compresses the range of ground orientations with which 
humans are confronted. This fact is probably quite im­
portant to understanding why surface orientation can be 
systematically overestimated without much cost. The sta­
tistical distribution of surface orientations in the environ­
ment may, in fact, encourage the expanded coding of sur­
face orientation (Durgin & Li, 2011a; Proffitt, 2006). The 
second point is that errors in the estimation of surface 
orientation do not depend exclusively on visual factors.
Figure II. 16-1. The basic phenomenology: If a hill appears to be 
nearly 30°, it is probably about 8°. The perceptual error is consistent 
with foreshortening along the line of sight in the pictured (uphill) 
case, but downhill slopes also look very steep, which cannot be 
explained by foreshortening along the line of sight.
Estimates of underfoot ground orientation while standing 
on a ramp, for example, show similar patterns of overesti­
mation—even for congenitally blind participants (Hajnal, 
Abdul-Malak, & Durgin, 2011). Indeed, very steep ramps 
(i.e., 14°) can be judged even steeper under foot (hapti- 
cally) than when regarded visually (Durgin et al., 2009; 
Hajnal et al., 2011). Spatial bias in the haptic perception 
of surface slant has recently been reviewed (Durgin & 
Li, 2012). This chapter focuses on visual slant perception 
while noting similarities and differences with haptic slant 
perception. Several of the phenomena discussed here, 
such as the effect of viewing distance on slant perception, 
are primarily relevant to vision.
Theories of slant overestimation have fallen into the two 
broad categories of teleological (or functional) theories and 
mechanistic (or incidental) theories. Functional theories 
have focused on several kinds of perceptual or behavioral 
advantages that might arise from the exaggerated coding 
or representation of ground orientation. In the natural en­
vironment, sensitivity to ground orientation might be used 
as a basis for recognizing one’s facing direction or location 
in a familiar geographic region (Nardi, Nitsch, & Bingman, 
2010). It might also be particularly useful for taking en­
ergetics into account during route planning (Bhalla 
& Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt, 2006), and energy costs are 
highly relevant to coding the vertical dimension of space 
(Kammann, 1967). Perceptual error might even be used to 
more efficiently guide motor planning (Hajnal et al., 2011; 
Li & Durgin, 2012b) or simply to more efficiently represent 
the layout of the environment (Durgin & Li, 2011a; Durgin, 
Li, & Hajnal, 2010).
Incidental theories of slant misperception have in­
cluded the idea that depth along the line of sight is fore­
shortened (Ross, 1974), which is sufficient to predict that 
uphill surfaces will appear too steep, that the perceived 
horizontal is altered in the presence of hills (O’Shea & 
Ross, 2007), or that perceptual biases tend to make sur­
faces appear more frontal than they are (Gibson, 1950). 
Each of these incidental theories has some measure of 
support, but none of them seem to fully account for the 
full range of observed perceptual biases. The incomplete­
ness of these incidental theories has led some theorists to 
neglect their importance. But a full account of the over­
estimation of slant must take these facts into account 
as well.
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This chapter argues for a hybrid theory of slant misper­
ception that includes both functional and incidental compo­
nents. Whereas the exaggeration of the vertical dimension 
has a clear value for layout recognition and route planning, 
it may be that a more general perceptual coding advantage 
supports both of these kinds of goals rather than privileg­
ing one or the other. The phenomenology of slant percep­
tion is relevant to this discussion.
CONSTANCY AND NONCONSTANCY IN SLANT 
PERCEPTION
Constancy refers to the ability of an organism to perceive 
one aspect of an object (such as slant) consistently despite 
irrelevant changes in viewing conditions (such as view­
ing orientation and optical distance). In this section we 
examine constancy and explain that there are at least 
two important respects in which the perception of slant is 
clearly not constant and three important respects in which
it is surprisingly constant. In general, purely functional­
ist theories have limited resources for accounting for the 
failures of constancy described here, whereas purely inci­
dental theories are often contraindicated by the presence 
of constancy.
Effects of Viewing Distance
As viewing distance from a hill surface increases, the per­
ceived slant of the surface tends to increase (become more 
vertical), as illustrated in Figure II.16-2. This was demon­
strated by Bridgeman and Hoover (2008) by having par­
ticipants look at different fixation points along a hill of 
constant slope. At farther distances, perceived slants were 
greater. This effect is not due simply to a diminution of tex­
ture information in the distance or changes in perspective. 
The perceived orientations of large slanted surfaces (6°—36°) 
increase approximately linearly as a function of log dis­
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Figure II.16-2. For a farther observer, a hill will appear steeper, (a) An illustration of the empirically derived model of the effects of viewing 
distance on perceived slant (Li & Durgin, 2010, 2013). At each distance, slant judgments have a gain of about 1.5 (the function is primarily 
sinusoidal), (b) This one-parameter model fares well at predicting the hill estimation data of Proffitt et al. (1995): each white circle (in both 
graphs) represents the model prediction for a specific hill slant taking into account both its slant and the optical distance to hill for an observer 
at the base of the hill, viewing it with gaze forward, (c) The effect of distance generalizes to farther or nearer viewing: a hill of about 24° will be 
estimated as 42° when standing at the base (with gaze forward, the optical distance to the hill would be about 3.6 m) but as 48° when standing 
10 m back from the base (i.e., 13.6 m from the hill surface at eye level).
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to distance are held constant using high-resolution virtual 
displays (Li & Durgin, 2010). This slope nonconstancy with 
distance can be measured with both explicit verbal estimates 
of slant and with implicit slant estimates based on judgment 
of perceived shape on the hill surface. That is, if an L-shaped 
configuration of balls is simulated on a hill surface and mea­
surement is made of the perceived ratio between frontal and 
sagittal arms of the L, one can use trigonometry to compute 
the implied surface orientation relative to the line of gaze. 
Such computations turn out to be roughly consistent with 
verbal estimates, helping to confirm that the overestimation 
of slant is not simply a verbal error.
In the classic hill slant estimation studies of Proffitt et al. 
(1995), observers were asked to make slant judgments while 
viewing the hills with gaze forward and standing near the 
base of the hill. This means that shallow hills would have 
been observed at a much larger optical distance than steeper 
hills. For example, assuming an eye height of 1.6 m, a path 
of 5° would only reach eye level 18 m away, whereas, a steep 
embankment of 33° would reach eye level within 2.5 m. To 
address this confound, Li and Durgin (2010) conducted their 
study of effects of viewing distance. When viewing distance 
was kept fixed, the relationship between slant and perceived 
slant (in the measured range of 0°-36°) turned out to be well 
predicted by assuming that perceived slant increases with 
a gain of 1.5 relative to physical slant (Li & Durgin, 2010). 
In fact, a gain of 1.5 is consistent with the first quarter cycle 
of a sinusoidal function, which also seems to approximate 
the function that relates physical slant to perceived slant 
for small surfaces in reach (Durgin & Li, 2012; Durgin, Li, 
et al., 2010). Li and Durgin (2013) have further developed a 
sine-based model as illustrated in Figure II. 16-2.
Panel (a) of Figure II. 16-2 illustrates the principal features 
of the models developed by Li and Durgin (2010, 2013): At 
each viewing distance, the perceived slant functions have a 
gain of approximately 1.5, but the effective intercepts of the 
functions increase with the log of viewing distance. In this 
case we have plotted the slant functions for viewing distances 
associated with each of six of the hills tested by Proffitt et al. 
(1995), as well as noting the specific slant shown at each dis­
tance using the sine-based model of Li and Durgin (2013, 
Equation 3). Panel (b) of Figure II.16-2 replots these predicted 
points (and three others) along with the associated means 
and standard errors from of Proffitt et al. Although the slant 
model was developed using virtual displays and imphcit slant 
measurements fudging the aspect ratio of an L-shaped ar­
rangement of balls on a hill surface), it provides an excellent 
fit to outdoor verbal estimation data.
This nonconstancy of perceived slant with respect to view­
ing distance is hkely an incidental effect due to a failure of ste­
reoscopic depth scaling. Although textbooks typically discuss 
binocular disparity as a useful depth cue only for near space, 
disparity information can be useful out to nearly a kilome­
ter for surfaces that are sufficiently extended in depth (such 
as hills), but the scaling of stereoscopic depth information is 
known to show poor constancy at far distances (Palmisano 
et al., 2010). Many people are aware of the fact that moun­
tains in the distance look essentially vertical. What is harder 
to notice (though it is observable) is that the apparent slants 
of hills gradually become shallower as we get closer to them.
If we consider the various functional accounts of hill 
misperception, it is difficult to see how any of them is
strengthened by the effects of viewing distance. Perhaps 
a landmark could be more readily noted if its slant is ex­
aggerated with distance, but using slant to orient to the 
environment would seem, on the face of it, to demand more 
constancy rather than less. Similarly, a functional account 
in terms of energetics should have trouble accounting for 
nonconstancies. If a climbable slope seems insurmount­
able when viewed in the distance, this does not seem par­
ticularly useful for route planning. The only functionalist 
theory that seems to be directly compatible with distance 
effects (i.e., not contradicted by them) is the expanded 
coding theory. Coding theory only need imply that slants 
will be exaggerated to better act upon them. Within imme­
diate action space (several meters), the nonconstancies are 
both minor and fully predictable.
Failures of Constancy as Optical Slant Decreases
Li and Durgin (2009) found that downhill slants show a no­
ticeable failure of constancy, depending on viewpoint. Using 
controls for viewing distance, Li and Durgin reported that 
downhill slants appeared steepest when the direction of 
view is nearly parallel to the hill surface, such as when our 
gaze first crests them. Many skiers have confirmed the basic 
observation that a downhill slope appears less steep as one 
gets closer to the edge. Some report that they try to maxi­
mize the sense of danger by initiating the process of launch­
ing themselves onto the hill before they have fully crested it. 
The apparent steepening of the hill at the point where gaze 
is nearly parallel with the surface may serve to signal uncer­
tainty or risk, but it nonetheless appears to be an incidental 
effect rather than primarily functional because the steep­
ening effect for downhill slants has a corresponding effect 
for uphill slants: When gaze is nearly parallel to slant, the 
visual system tends to treat gaze direction itself as the sole 
estimate of slant (Durgin & Li, 2011a). This effect has been 
observed for real and simulated downhill surfaces (Li & 
Durgin, 2009) as well as for small uphill simulated surfaces 
viewed at shallow optical slants, with gaze nearly parallel to 
the surface orientation (Durgin & Li, 2011a).
Evidence for Constancy With Viewing Direction
A surprising amount of constancy is evident in slant per­
ception with respect to the lateral direction of gaze. Proffitt, 
Creem, and Zosh (2001) showed that, even when people 
looked at a hill from an oblique perspective, participants’ 
estimates remained exaggerated. Proffitt et al. did not 
control for viewing distance, but their data strongly sug­
gest that the encoding of three-dimensional slant provides 
substantial constancy with respect to direction of observa­
tion. For smaller, uphill surfaces, Durgin, Li, et al. (2010) 
reported an impressive amount of constancy as well with 
changes in the pitch of gaze, suggesting that coding biases 
in slant perception affect geographical slant (slant rela­
tive to gravity) rather than optical slant (slant relative to 
the line of sight). As shown in Figure II.16-3a, Durgin, Li, 
et al. had participants estimate the slants of small surfaces 
either with gaze forward or with gaze declined by nearly 
45°. If slant misestimation were due primarily to distance 
foreshortening along the line of sight (also known as fron­
tal tendency”), then a board at about 60° from horizontal
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should seem steeper with gaze forward (Fig. II.16-3a, right) 
than with gaze downward (Fig. II.16-3a, left), but no sub­
stantial differences were found. The function relating per­
ceived slant to actual slant can be approximated by a sinu­
soid for slants within arm’s reach (Li & Durgin, 2013). This 
effect is not verbal/numeric: the same spatial bias occurs 
whether numeric estimates are made relative to vertical 
or to horizontal. Moreover, when a forced-choice procedure 
was used to measure the bisection point between vertical 
and horizontal, surfaces of about 34® from horizontal were 
judged as being 45° (from horizontal and from vertical).
Figure II.16-3. (a) In near space, the same estimation function is 
found for slant whether surfaces are viewed with gaze downwEU-d or 
with gaze forward (Durgin, Li et al., 2010). (b) Hills look steeper when 
standing back from the edge so that gaze is nearly parallel to the 
surface of the hill. When optical slant (the angle between the center 
of gaze and the surface) is small, surface orientation is pulled toward 
the direction of gaze (Durgin & Li, 2011a; Li & Durgin, 2009). The 
angular declination of gaze is itself exaggerated (independent of the 
presence of the hill), which helps to account for the overestimation 
even at the edge, (c) For steep ramps, estimates given when 
blindfolded (haptic) more closely resemble visual estimates when gaze 
is forward (even when the head is bowed; Hajnal et al., 2011), than 
visual estimates when a nearer portion of the ramp is inspected.
Evidence for Constancy Across Surface Size
Although slant illusions are less dramatic for near surfaces 
at eye level, in the range of slants between 0° and about 50°, 
perceived orientation is expanded with a gain of about 1.5 
(Durgin & Li, 2011a). This same 1.5 gain function is evident 
in the models of large-scale slants discussed previously. 
That is, the perceived orientation of small real surfaces pre­
sented under full-cue conditions are expanded in the lower 
half of the range by a factor of about 1.5, and exactly the 
same scaling factor applies to large-scale hills. Thus the 
perceived orientation of large-scale surfaces seems to be 
no different, with respect to bias, than the perceived ori­
entation of smaller-scale surfaces. The success of the sine- 
based model in capturing both the hill data and the data 
from small surfaces shows that there is no discontinuity 
between small and large surfaces in slant misperception (Li 
& Durgin, 2013). This point, again, is consistent with the 
expanded coding theory because it points to a generalized 
coding scheme that applies to slant in general rather than 
exclusively to landmarks or to intended paths of travel.
Evidence for Constancy Across Modalities
As reviewed by us elsewhere, a sine-based model can apply 
to haptic surface perception by hand as well (Durgin & Li, 
2012) and even to proprioception of hand orientation (Li & 
Durgin, 2012b). Thus the underlying spatial bias function 
in slant perception seems to be multimodal. Even in the 
cases that seem exceptional, further analysis suggests good 
calibration between modalities. For example, Durgin et al. 
(2009) reported that verbal estimates of a 14.5° ramp were 
only 26° when based on visual inspection of the ramp while 
standing near the base (and looking down), whereas esti­
mates from haptic information while standing on the ramp 
were closer to 31°. The second (haptic) estimate corresponds 
well with the sine-based model estimate of visually per­
ceived slant for a 14.5° hill when viewed with gaze forward 
from the base (with a viewing distance to surface of about 
6.5 m). In other words, if a person were walking up such a 
hill and simultaneously viewing the hill with gaze forward, 
the visual perception of slant and the haptic perception 
would be aligned (both would be about 31°). In contrast, the 
26° estimate can be arrived at by using the actual viewing 
distance to the ramp surface (about 2 m) in the model.
Summary of Slant Constancy
The evidence we have reviewed here suggests that per­
ceived slant shows marked failures of constancy with 
viewing distance and with certain extreme directions of 
gaze with respect to surface orientation. In contrast, visu­
ally perceived slant is remarkably constant across most 
changes in viewing orientation, across different scales of 
surface size (when viewing distance is taken into account), 
and across different modalities. Perhaps the most signifi­
cant fact about the systematic biases in slant perception 
is that these biases seem to be coded primarily with re­
spect to the extrinsic reference frame specified by gravity 
(Durgin, Li, et al., 2010) though some incidental effects in­
dicate that there are also consistent biases with respect to 
optical slant as well.
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SOCIOCOGNITIVE FACTORS IN THE 
EVALUATION OF SLANT
A number of reports have been made suggesting that 
slants look steeper to people for whom they represent 
a greater challenge to scale. Factors that have been re­
ported to affect the evaluation of slant include age, fit­
ness, encumberment, fatigue (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), 
fear (Stefanucci, Proffitt, Clore, & Parekh, 2008), social 
support (Schnall, Harber, Stefanucci, & Proffitt, 2008), 
and blood sugar (Schnall, Zadra, & Proffitt, 2010). These 
various studies have been critiqued extensively (Durgin 
et al., 2009; Durgin, Hajnal, Li, Tonge, & Stigliani, 2010, 
2011; Durgin, Klein, Spiegel, Strawser, & Williams, 2012; 
Durgin, Ruff, & Russell, 2012; Shaffer, McManama, 
Swank, & Durgin, 2013). In some cases, such as a study 
of the elderly, the originally published data actually con­
tradicted the hypothesis: The elderly gave lower estimates 
for most hills, but this was not made evident in the initial 
report. In other cases, such as a study of fitness, confound­
ing factors (e.g., sex differences in slant estimation) were 
not taken into account in the analyses (see Durgin, Hajnal, 
et al., 2010 for a discussion). In yet others concerned with 
fear, subjects may have been excluded from analysis in a 
manner that inadvertently biased the results (see Durgin 
et al., 2009, for a discussion).
The critiques of the studies of encumberment are 
worth reviewing briefly here. If participants in a study 
are simply asked to wear a heavy backpack, they tend to 
give higher estimates for hills than do nonencumbered 
participants. However, they also tend to report that they 
thought the backpack was supposed to make the hill look 
steeper (Durgin et al., 2009; Durgin, Klein, et al., 2012). If 
the backpack is instead presented as carrying equipment 
essential to the conduct of the experiment (Durgin et al., 
2009; Durgin, Ruff, et al., 2012; Shaffer et al., 2013), or 
participants are told not to let themselves be influenced by 
the backpack (Durgin, Klein, et al., 2012), the judgments 
that they give tend to be identical to those of nonencum­
bered participants. In general, the use of heavy backpacks 
that are transparently intended to increase estimates of 
slant seem to produce social pressure on participants to 
elevate their slant estimates. Susceptibility to that social 
pressure can be mitigated by social support (Schnall et al., 
2008) and may be exacerbated by low blood sugar (Durgin, 
Klein, et al., 2012; Schnall et al., 2010; Shaffer et al., 2013). 
Durgin, Klein, et al. (2012) found that the effects of blood 
sugar disappeared when participants were simply told 
to ignore the heavy backpack they were required to wear 
during such studies. Shaffer et al. (2013) showed that low 
blood sugar produces opposite effects (lower estimates) if 
participants believe the drink (which they assume con­
tained sugar) was supposed to make the hill look shallower. 
Disputes over these sorts of controversial findings remain 
lively in the literature (e.g.. Firestone, 2013). It is very 
clear that social compliance can have powerful effects on 
judgments and should be taken into consideration in stud­
ies that are ostensibly of perception.
The idea that slant overestimation provides a means for 
the direct perception of the energetic affordances of the en­
vironment (Proffitt, 2006) is quite a clever one. However, 
much of the evidence amassed in support of this theory
has proven problematic, and no direct connection seems to 
exist between energetics and slant perception (e.g., Shaffer 
& Flint, 2011). A surviving tenet of this view, however, is 
that geometric accuracy might not be the proper goal of 
perceptual representation. This is also a tenet of expanded 
scaling theory, and if the exaggeration of perceived slant 
incidentally helps people to more reliably evaluate the en­
ergetic affordances of the environment for the purpose of 
route planning, so much the better.
THE ROLE OF THE PERCEIVED DIRECTION 
OF GAZE
Because slant is defined relative to a gravitational reference 
frame (i.e., the horizontal plane and the vertical vector of 
gravity that is normal to horizontal), errors in perceived slant 
could come about if the presence of a hill produced a distortion 
in the perception of the horizontal plane. O Shea and Ross 
(2009) have provided evidence for such effects in the presence 
of large-scale mountains (see also Matin & li, 1992), and Ooi 
and He (2007) have suggested that the ground plane itself is 
perceived as being tilted upward. The magnitude of such ef­
fects, however (about 3°-5°), is insufficient to account for the 
very large magnitudes of distortion in perceived slant.
Recently a much more dramatic distortion in perceived 
gaze direction has been documented that seems more con­
sistent with the overestimation of slant. Specifically, much 
as the perceptual gain for perceived slants (less than 45°) 
is about 1.5 when distance is fixed, Li and Durgin (2009; 
Durgin & Li, 2011a) have used a variety of methods to docu­
ment that the perceived declination of gaze is also coded 
with a gain of about 1.5. Durgin and Li (2011a; Li & Durgin, 
2012a) have proposed that angular variables relevant to the 
pitch axis are coded on an expanded scale so as to increase 
their precision because they are highly relevant for action.
Gaze declination relative to the horizon is a powerful 
cue to distance (Messing & Durgin, 2005; Ooi, Wu & He, 
2001; Sedgwick, 1986; Wallach & O’Leary, 1982), because 
on leWl ground (and most of the spaces we deal with are 
within 5° of level) it provides highly reliable proprioceptive 
cue to ground distance. Given the bandwidth limitations 
of neural transmission, coding this angular variable on an 
expanded scale would preserve greater precision relevant 
for the control of action. Thus a functional account of slant 
overestimation derives in part from the idea that angular 
distortions are present in perceptual experience in order 
to maintain precision for action. The expanded scaling of 
perceived gaze declination has been measured implicitly 
(Durgin & Li, 2011a; Li & Durgin, 2009) based on slant 
estimates viewed along different lines of sight; it has been 
measured directly with balls suspended in the air or placed 
along the ground, and it has been measured by means of 
a bisection task (Durgin & Li, 2011a; see also Durgin & 
Li, 2011b). In all cases the gain was found to be approxi­
mately 1.5. Studies of verbal distance estimation among 
nonexperts tend to suggest linear compression of per­
ceived ground distance by a factor of 0.7 to 0.8 (Loomis & 
Philbeck, 2008), consistent with a misperception of gaze di­
rection, as illustrated in Figure II.16-4a. Rather than hills 
looking steep because of distance foreshortening, it may be 
that ground distances are underestimated because crucial
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Figure II.16-4. (a) Independent of the presence of a ground surface, 
perceived gaze declination (within 45° of horizontal) is exaggerated 
by a gain of 1.5 (Durgin & Li, 2011a; Li & Durgin, 2009). (b) Asked 
to set themselves the same distance from a pole as the pole is high, 
participants set themselves much too far away (Higashiyama &
Ueyama, 1988). The mismatch between their perceptual experience and 
the physical situation can be predicted by the scaling of the perceived 
angular declination of gaze (Li et al., 2011).
angular variables, such as the angle of gaze declination, 
are systematically misperceived.
Strikingly, this expanded scaling of perceived angular 
declination of gaze (along with a concomitant scaling of op­
tical slant) can predict not only downhill slant perception 
(Li & Durgin, 2009; see Fig. II. 16-3, bottom) but also sys­
tematic errors in the comparison of distance and height. 
For example, Higashiyama and Ueyama (1988) developed a 
task requiring participants to place themselves at the same 
distance from objects (such as poles) as those objects were 
high. Participants placed themselves much too far away, as 
illustrated in Figure II.16-4b. Li, Phillips, and Durgin (2011) 
recently replicated this experiment and extended it to show 
that the exact pattern of results reported by Higashiyama 
and Ueyama could be predicted by a parameter-free geo­
metric model in which the previously measured angular 
declination gain of 1.5 was assumed. This suggests that hill 
misperception is part of a larger pattern of angular distor­
tions that affect the perception of surface layout generally.
THEN WHY DO HILLS LOOK SO STEEP?
Slant misperception is dramatic. An editor at a journal 
once challenged the statement that Lombard Street in San 
Francisco is on a hill that is only 15° in slope. He said he 
had checked the Internet and found that the true value is 
31°. He was correct that many sites on the Internet report 
a value of 31°. In fact, the tangent of 15° is 0.31, and so
the grade of the hill is 31% (a 100% grade would be a 45° 
slope). Since 15° is simply unbelievable for anyone who has 
been to Lombard Street, many websites simply report this 
as 31° (which still seems too low compared to the percep­
tual phenomenology). The hill is so steep that Lombard 
Street winds back and forth across it so as to reduce the 
effective slant of the road to 10°—still quite steep when 
walking up it!
As Marr (1982) pointed out, there are many different 
forms of answers to questions about explanation, includ­
ing the functional and the mechanistic. This chapter has 
considered the phenomenology of hill perception while dis­
cussing a variety of theories that have been proposed. One 
answer to the question in the title might remain the one 
put forth by Kammann (1967): because of gravity. The en­
vironment in which we have evolved is laid out such that 
vertical extents and slants are relatively tiny compared 
to horizontal extents. Expanding the vertical scaling of 
such an environment might produce many cognitive ad­
vantages, even if that expansion is done in angular terms. 
A second, mechanistic answer remains: because of a loss of 
reliable information for depth along the line of sight. This 
latter answer addresses the failure of slant constancy with 
changes in viewing distance, but it cannot be the whole 
story, because it does not account for the misperception 
of downhill slant or the relative constancy of perceived 
slant with large changes in angle of regard. This chapter 
has emphasized that the misperception of hills is probably 
part of a larger family of biases in the perception of angu­
lar variables that includes the misperception of small sur­
faces in reach and may even include the misperception of 
ground distance and height based on multiplicative biases 
in perceived angular deviations of visual direction from 
horizontal.
Although this review has taken sides on some contro­
versies, there is not room to address controversies over the 
interpretation of different measurement techniques for 
evaluating perceived slant (e.g., Coleman & Durgin, 2014; 
Creem & Proffitt, 1998; Durgin, 2013; Durgin, Hajnal, 
et al., 2010; Durgin, Li, et al., 2010; Li & Durgin, 2010, 
2011, 2013; Shaffer, McManama, Swank, Williams, & 
Durgin, 2014; Stigliani, Li, & Durgin, 2013; Taylor-Covill 
& Eves, 2013; Witt & Proffitt, 2007). These controversies 
focus around the question of whether using a haptic match­
ing task to measure slant provides a route to a separate 
(undistorted) dorsal stream representation.
It is therefore worth making one final point about the 
nonconsequences of slant misperception. Our actions seem 
to be coded in the same perceptual space as everything else 
(Powers, 1973). This means that acting with accuracy in 
a perceptually distorted world requires only that actions 
be calibrated to the same distortions (Durgin, 2009). For 
example, because proprioception of hand orientation is 
distorted with precisely the same function as the haptic 
and visual perception of surfaces (Li & Durgin, 2012b), the 
perceptual distortions documented here are transparent to 
our action systems. We can live and act effectively in a dis­
torted visual world. Because the distortion is fairly stable, 
and the correlations between motor signals and sensory 
signals are maintained, even the effects of nonconstancy 
with distance can be predicted and therefore ignored in our 
normal perceptual experience. An important part of the
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answer to why hills (and even small surfaces in reach) look 
so steep is therefore: Why not?
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